the study is grounded in states and, surprisingly, empire.

This mix produces a problem, reflected in Gorman’s decision to sharply divide the book into two largely independent parts. The first, “Imperial Internationalism,” is an account of relations of the various societies within the British Empire from roughly 1900 through the British Empire Games held in Canada in 1930. Gorman mentions the innovation of a “winner’s platform” at the games, which was copied by the Olympic Games at Los Angeles two years later, but he does not mention that with the exception of Bermuda, only white settler societies were represented.

The color line is largely absent in Gorman’s account of internationalism and empire. By contrast, he is well aware of maternalist approaches to empire and addresses at some length women’s issues and the feminization of the Social Section of the League of Nations. He also observes an important shift away from a racial category (“white slave trade”) to a gender one (“traffic in women and children”) (p. 57). Though he does not emphasize the point, he does implicitly address race in his discussion of the limits of “imperial citizenship,” which, much to the disappointment of Indian reformers, applied only to settler societies. A more detailed analysis would have been welcome.

Part 2 examines Anglo-American relations but does not focus on “international society” either. Gorman does, however, highlight an important distinction between those who were interested in cultural and institutional connections as devices to advance international peace and those who looked to international law. Overall, this study seems awkwardly caught between traditional international relations and the cultural turn in diplomatic history. Another theme that I wish had been developed further is the play of opinion, national and international, not so much as a stimulus for national mobilization but as a limiting factor in international affairs. Conversely, Gorman presents substantial evidence that reinforces the historian Erez Manela’s account of the anticolonial leaders who were cheered by Woodrow Wilson’s promise of self-determination only to learn that the message was not intended for their ears (“Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919,” American Historical Review, Dec. 2006, pp. 1327–51). In the end, although Gorman deploys the word cosmopolitan, his book does not give us a cosmopolitan history of “international society.”

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Almost all Americans, we can safely assume, recognize the name Henry Ford and are familiar with the man’s legendary role in the history of the automobile. A certain number of people are also familiar with the notorious anti-Semitic tract The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1903). And Louis Marshall, the founder and first director of the American Jewish Committee, is probably familiar to leaders of the Jewish community. At best, perhaps a few specialists on the history of anti-Semitism in the United States recognize the name Aaron Sapiro.

Victoria Saker Woeste’s Henry Ford’s War on Jews and the Legal Battle against Hate Speech brings these three people and the one publication together in an illuminating history of Sapiro’s libel suit against Ford. Ford’s newspaper, the Dearborn Independent, published a series of anti-Semitic articles dealing with Jewish exploitation of farmers’ organizations. The articles aimed a particularly bitter attack at Sapiro, who was committed to the idea of farm cooperatives. The newspaper accused him of being part of a conspiracy to control the world’s food market. Sapiro responded with the libel suit. Looming over the case and giving it greater significance was Ford’s earlier publication of ninety articles in a series on “The International Jew,” based on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

Sapiro’s suit ended in a mistrial, and before a new trial could begin the formidable figure of Marshall entered the picture. He was the quintessential civic activist, seeking to defend American Jews through quiet backstage negotiations rather than via confrontational law suits. With his eye mainly on The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Marshall persuaded Ford to sign an apology for his anti-Semitism (which Marshall had drafted). Ford also consented to shutting down the Dearborn Independent and promised to restrict further
distribution of *The International Jew*, a four-volume compilation of the original articles, published between 1920 and 1922. Ford was widely hailed for the apology, and it appeared to be a triumph for tolerance. In reality, he disingenuously claimed that he had not been aware of the anti-Semitic tone of the articles. He was also unable to stop further publication of *The International Jew* in Europe and other parts of the world. It is impossible to measure its impact, but Ford’s version of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* undoubtedly contributed to the Holocaust.

Woeste’s book is not the history of the legal doctrine of group libel. Rather it is a rich social history of a public controversy and a long-forgotten libel suit. Its strength is in delineating the contingencies involved in the interplay of strong personalities, organizations, and conflicting strategies for combating bigotry. In passing, Woeste illuminates a fascinating chapter in American economic history during the 1920s with an account of Sapiro’s role in promoting agricultural marketing cooperatives. Most importantly, she provides insight into the conflicting approaches of Sapiro (as the classic outsider) and Marshall (as the establishment leader) about how to respond to Ford’s anti-Semitism. Her analysis has broader relevance for understanding the internal strategy debates among groups trying to fight their outcast status.

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*The FBI’s Obscene File* tackles a mysterious and titillating subject—one that has especially intrigued historians of sexuality. This first monograph on the topic is both narrower and broader than its subtitle suggests: the book reveals little about J. Edgar Hoover as a person but follows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) well beyond his death. The omission of Hoover’s personal life is disappointing. Hoover was a fascinating specimen of human sexuality; many of his contemporaries and biographers believe that he was gay, yet he led an extended and vicious witch-hunt against homosexuals. Douglas M. Charles makes little mention of Hoover’s sexuality even though he identifies Hoover’s “personal interest in the issue of obscenity” as “the driving force behind the FBI’s obscenity cases” (p. 88). Hoover emerges here as a single-minded bureaucrat whose obsession with prosecuting producers and distributors of obscenity was motivated primarily by political and professional ambitions.

This book details how broad cultural and political developments shaped Hoover’s antiobscenity crusade even as he aimed to shape American culture and politics in areas such as partisan politics, presidential policies, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions as well as popular culture, grassroots movements, and mainstream moral standards. Federal antiobscenity efforts, however, were not simply top-down initiatives; they were also responses to the demands of civic and religious groups as well as individual citizens.

The FBI established its first obscene-materials file after Hoover assumed control of the organization in 1924. His goal was to use the file as a crime-fighting tool during this time of perceived loose sexual mores and when daring literature and films became more common. Not until the United States entered the World War II did the FBI direct its antiobscenity work less at criminals and more at “leftists” and others whom Hoover considered enemies of the United States. Thus, the focus of the bureau shifted to shaping “public policy and attitudes” through propaganda and repression (p. 25). In one tantalizing instance Hoover made his Obscene File available to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) when it sought images of “Japanese individuals in lascivious poses” that would help the OSS inspire hatred of the enemy (p. 34). After the war Hoover targeted new “un-American” influences: communism, “race music”—also known as “rhythm and blues”—and homosexuality (p. 40).

Between 1957 and 1967, Hoover’s FBI resisted the Warren court’s liberalizing opinions by educating the public about “the dangers of obscenity” and coordinating its efforts with President Richard M. Nixon (p. 65). Many individuals associated with the Watergate scandal show up here as leaders in Nixon and the FBI’s crusade against smut.