Term Limits and Executive Tenure

A comprehensive study of the rules of executive tenure explores why term limits are violated and asks what systems would make them more effective

Constitutional term limits are important for the functioning of democracy. While they do limit the ability of voters to continuously reelect a popular leader, they carry the benefit of ensuring rotation in an executive office and preventing voters from coming to see the incumbent as the only viable option for that position.  

In the United States, no president has violated the limit of two terms set by the Twenty-second Amendment. In all of American history, only Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was elected four times before the Amendment’s passage in 1947, served more than two terms. A tradition set by George Washington with his resignation after two terms is understood as having restrained other presidents before the amendment was passed.  

While term limits in the US have so far been effective, there’s reason to believe this may not always be the case. In March of 2025, months into his second term as president, Donald Trump did not rule out the possibility of a third term in an interview with NBC News, saying that there are “methods” which would make another term possible.  

Outside of the US, term limit violations are not an uncommon problem. Term limits can be overcome through a variety of means: obtaining favorable rulings from constitutional courts, rewriting the constitution, inventing new powers, suspending constitutional order, and more.  

In countries around the world, people live in democratic states under leaders who refuse to leave office when laws or political customs dictate they must. Often these leaders were democratically elected—sometimes, the fact they are (or were) popular among the electorate becomes a justification for their continued rein.  

How, then, should governments ensure that leaders leave office on cue? The answer might not lie just in disincentivizing executive overstay, but also in making leaving office a more attractive option.  

A new research project led by Tom Ginsburg seeks to understand what leads to executive term limit violations and how these violations can be prevented with more effective systems. Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Distinguished Service Professor of International Law and Ludwig Hilde Wolf Research Scholar at the University of Chicago Law School. He is the Faculty Director of the University of Chicago Forum on Free Inquiry and Expression and of the Malyi Center for the Study of Institutional and Legal Integrity. Ginsburg is also an ABF Research Professor. 

Legal immunity for ex-presidents for actions taken during their presidency is one thing that could encourage more presidents to leave office according to term limits. While extreme blanket immunity can encourage bad behavior in presidents, some level of immunity prevents the kinds of situations seen in Peru or South Korea, where executives are routinely prosecuted upon leaving office. Having some assurance of a future political career, an honorific position, or even the extension of pensions may incentivize leaders against exceeding their term limits.  

This research will draw on the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), a longstanding project directed by Ginsburg which aims to gather data on the contents of the world’s constitutions. Data on over 800 constitutions and from more than 200 countries will allow the researchers to document how term limits have evolved over. The project’s empirical examination of term limits will be complemented by interviews with ex-leaders from around the world. These interviews will provide significant insight into the decision of a leader to overstay their term or not from a personal, psychological point of view.  

Executive overstay can upend democracies, turning the executive branch into something more like monarchical rule. This project, by aiming to understand why it happens from a variety of perspectives, makes it possible to rethink the systems that make our democracies work. While no single combination of incentives or disincentives will eliminate the problem for every country, Ginsburg’s research will establish a clear basis for understanding the problem and offer potential paths forward for addressing it.